Resumen En la crítica del Cantar de los Cantares no hay acuerdo acerca del problema estructural del libro. Las teorías se dividen en aquellas que abogan por un carácter fragmentario contra otras que ven un carácter unitario de los poemas. El estudio intenta revisar esta problemática y proponer que el Cantar de los Cantares es una colección de poemas sueltos que un redactor/recopilador juntó e intentó poner en cierto orden, incorporando el conjuro de 2,7; 3,5; 5,8; 8,4 como estribillo con (...) función articuladora, de tal manera que el conjuro quedó puesto como hito divisorio entre grandes bloques poéticos que se relacionan entre sí por un tema común u otro recurso de mano redaccional, configurando así un ordenamiento estructural de todo el libro.In the criticism of the Song of Songs there is no agreement on the structural problem of the book. Theories are divided into those advocating a fragmentary against others who see a unitary character of poems. The study attempts to revise this problems and propose that the Song of Songs is a loose collection of poems that a compiler gathered and tried to give some order, incorporating the adjuration of 2, 7; 3,5; 5,8; 8,4 as refrain with articulate function, such that the adjuration was set as milestone dividing between large blocks poetic that interrelate by a common theme or other resource or literary technique thus configuring a structural arrangement of the whole book. (shrink)

Do we have positive duties to help others in need or are our moral duties only negative, focused on not harming them? Are any of the former positive duties, duties of justice that respond to enforceable rights? Is their scope global? Should we aim for global equality besides the eradication of severe global poverty? Is a humanist approach to egalitarian distribution based on rights that all human beings as such have defensible, or must egalitarian distribution be seen in an associativist (...) way, as tracking existing frameworks such as statehood and economic interdependence? Are the eradication of global poverty and the achievement of global equality practically feasible or are they hopelessly utopian wishes? -/- This book argues that there are basic positive duties of justice to help eradicate severe global poverty; that global egalitarian principles are also reasonable even if they cannot be fully realized in the short term; and that there are dynamic duties to enhance the feasibility of the transition from global poverty to global equality in the face of nonideal circumstances such as the absence of robust international institutions and the lack of a strong ethos of cosmopolitan solidarity. The very notion of feasibility is crucial for normative reasoning, but has received little explicit philosophical discussion. This book offers a systematic exploration of that concept as well as of its application to global justice. It also arbitrates the current debate between humanist and associativist accounts of the scope of distributive justice. Drawing on moral contractualism (the view that we ought to follow the principles that no one could reasonably reject), this book provides a novel defense of humanism, challenges several versions of associativism (which remains the most popular view among political philosophers), and seeks to integrate the insights underlying both views. (shrink)

Este ensayo parte de una experiencia disruptiva en un aula de bachillerato de un instituto español. En el transcurso de una clase ordinaria de filosofía, un incidente inesperado rompe la definición de la situación, haciendo añicos el consenso de trabajo entre los alumnos y el profesor. Para reconstruir su trasfondo de expectativas, los alumnos se ven forzados a emplear estrategias de acomodación y normalización. En el análisis de esta experiencia disruptiva convergen la fenomenología del mundo social de Alfred Schütz, la (...) etnometodología de Harold Garfinkel y el interaccionismo simbólico de Erving Goffman.This essay starts from a disruptive experience in a Spanish high school classroom. In the course of an ordinary philosophy lesson, an unexpected incident breaks the definition of the situation, smashing the working consensus among students and teacher to smithereens. In order to rebuild their background expectancies, the pupils are forced to resort to accommodation and normalization strategies. The analysis of this disruptive experience is based upon the convergence of Alfred Schütz’s phenomenology of the social world, Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, and Erving Goffman’s symbolic interactionism. (shrink)

The concept of mental privacy can be defined as the principle that subjects should have control over the access to their own neural data and to the information about the mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing it. Our aim is to contribute to the current debate on mental privacy by identifying the main positions, articulating key assumptions and addressing central arguments. First, we map the different positions found in current literature. We distinguish between those who dismiss (...) concerns about mental privacy and those who endorse them. In this latter group, we establish a further disagreement between conservative and liberal strategies to protect mental privacy. Then, we address the first discussion by articulating and criticizing different skeptical views on mental privacy. Finally, we try to identify what are the unique features of neural data and examine how they may be connected to the ways in which neurotechnological mindreading could put mental privacy at risk. We suggest that even if neural data is unique, it may not require new strategies to protect people from its misuse. However, identifying the special features and risks of neurotechnological mind-reading is necessary for the second discussion on mental privacy to properly take off. (shrink)

This essay explores the relation between two perspectives on the nature of human rights. According to the "political" or "practical" perspective, human rights are claims that individuals have against certain institutional structures, in particular modern states, in virtue of interests they have in contexts that include them. According to the more traditional "humanist" or "naturalistic" perspective, human rights are pre-institutional claims that individuals have against all other individuals in virtue of interests characteristic of their common humanity. This essay argues that (...) once we identify the two perspectives in their best light, we can see that they are complementary and that in fact we need both to make good normative sense of the contemporary practice of human rights. It explains how humanist and political considerations can and should work in tandem to account for the concept, content, and justification of human rights. (shrink)

What should our theorizing about social justice aim at? Many political philosophers think that a crucial goal is to identify a perfectly just society. Amartya Sen disagrees. In The Idea of Justice, he argues that the proper goal of an inquiry about justice is to undertake comparative assessments of feasible social scenarios in order to identify reforms that involve justice-enhancement, or injustice-reduction, even if the results fall short of perfect justice. Sen calls this the “comparative approach” to the theory of (...) justice. He urges its adoption on the basis of a sustained critique of the former approach, which he calls “transcendental.” In this paper I pursue two tasks, one critical and the other constructive. First, I argue that Sen’s account of the contrast between the transcendental and the comparative approaches is not convincing, and second, I suggest what I take to be a broader and more plausible account of comparative assessments of justice. The core claim is that political philosophers should not shy away from the pursuit of ambitious theories of justice (including, for example, ideal theories of perfect justice), although they should engage in careful consideration of issues of political feasibility bearing on their practical implementation. (shrink)

Do we have positive duties to help others in need or are our moral duties only negative, focused on not harming them? If these positive duties exist, are they strong and strict demands or are they weak and discretionary? Can we say that at least some positive duties of assistance are also duties of justice worthy of institutionalization and coercive enforcement by legal institutions? Can the scope of some of such duties be cosmopolitan or should all of them be circumscribed (...) to what we owe to our compatriots? This paper addresses these questions from a Kantian perspective, and argues that Kant’s practical philosophy provides sufficient resources to develop and defend the claim that there are basic positive duties of justice, some of which have a global scope. (shrink)

This paper explores the connections between human rights, human dignity, and power. The idea of human dignity is omnipresent in human rights discourse, but its meaning and point is not always clear. It is standardly used in two ways, to refer to a normative status of persons that makes their treatment in terms of human rights a proper response, and a social condition of persons in which their human rights are fulfilled. This paper pursues three tasks. First, it provides an (...) analysis of the content and an interpretation of the role of the idea of human dignity in current human rights discourse. The interpretation includes a pluralist view of human interests and dignity that avoids a narrow focus on rational agency. Second, this paper characterizes the two aspects of human dignity in terms of capabilities. Certain general human capabilities are among the facts that ground status-dignity, and the presence of certain more specific capabilities constitutes condition-dignity. Finally, this paper explores how the pursuit of human rights and human dignity links to distributions and uses of power. Since capabilities are a form of power, and human rights are in part aimed at respecting and promoting capabilities, human rights involve empowerment. Exploring the connections between human rights, capabilities, and empowerment provides resources to defend controversial human rights such as the right to democratic political participation, and to respond to worries about the feasibility of their fulfillment. This paper also argues that empowerment must be coupled with solidaristic concern in order to respond to unavoidable facts of social dependency and vulnerability. (shrink)

To be justifiable, the demands of a conception of human rights and global justice must be such that (a) they focus on the protection of important human interests, and (b) their fulfilment is feasible. I discuss the feasibility condition. I present a general account of the relation between moral desirability, feasibility and obligation within a conception of justice. I analyse feasibility, a complex idea including different types, domains and degrees. It is possible to respond in various ways if the fulfilment (...) of basic socioeconomic human rights against severe poverty seems at first to be infeasible. (shrink)

The main purpose of these introductory remarks is to give the reader a sense of Philip Rossi’s philosophical project and its importance. I will then advance an interpretation of what motivates Kant’s commitment to community, and, on its basis, object to Rossi’s views on radical evil –a point which affects how one should conceive the moral vocation of humanity and the role that politics and religion play within it. My reconstruction concludes with a sketch of how the five contributions to (...) this Symposium fit together and deepen our understanding of Rossi’s overall project. (shrink)

In World Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge argues that the global rich have a duty to eradicate severe poverty in the world. The novelty of Pogges approach is to present this demand as stemming from basic commands which are negative rather than positive in nature: the global rich have an obligation to eradicate the radical poverty of the global poor not because of a norm of beneficence asking them to help those in need when they can at little cost (...) to themselves, but because of their having violated a principle of justice not to unduly harm others by imposing on them a coercive global order that makes their access to the objects of their human right to subsistence insecure. In this paper, I claim that although Pogge is right in arguing that negative duties are crucial in an account of global justice, he is wrong in saying that they are the only ones that are crucial. Harming the global poor by causing their poverty provides a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the global rich to have a duty of justice to assist them. After engaging in a critical analysis of Pogges argument, I conclude by suggesting the need for a robust conception of cosmopolitan solidarity that includes positive duties of assistance which are not mere duties of charity, but enforceable ones of justice. (shrink)

Human rights are particularly relevant in contexts in which there are significant asymmetries of power, but where these asymmetries exist the human rights project turns out to be especially difficult to realize. The stronger can use their disproportionate power both to threaten others’ human rights and to frustrate attempts to secure their fulfillment. They may even monopolize the international discussion as to what human rights are and how they should be implemented. This paper explores this tension between the normative ideal (...) of human rights and the facts of asymmetric power. It has two objectives. The first, pursued in section 2, is to reconstruct and assess a set of important power-related worries about human rights. These worries are sometimes presented as falsifying the view that human rights exist, or at least as warranting the abandonment of human rights practice. The paper argues that the worries do not support such conclusions. Instead, they motivate the identification of certain desiderata for the amelioration of human rights practice. The paper proceeds to articulate twelve such desiderata. The second objective, pursued in section 3, is to propose a strategy for satisfying the desiderata identified in the previous section. In particular, the paper suggests some ways to build empowerment into the human rights project that reduce the absolute and relative powerlessness of human rights holders, while also identifying an ethics of responsibility and solidarity for contexts in which power asymmetries will not dissolve. Power analysis does not debunk the human rights project. Properly articulated, it is an important tool for those pursuing it. (shrink)

One of the key behavioral effects of attractiveness is increased visual attention to attractive people. This effect is often explained in terms of evolutionary adaptations, such as attractiveness being an indicator of good health. Other factors could influence this effect. In the present study, we explored the modulating role of sexual orientation on the effects of attractiveness on exploratory visual behavior. Heterosexual and homosexual men and women viewed natural-looking scenes that depicted either two women or two men who varied systematically (...) in levels of attractiveness (based on a pre-study). Participants’ eye movements and attractiveness ratings towards the faces of the depicted people were recorded. The results showed that although attractiveness had the largest influence on participants’ behaviors, participants’ sexual orientations strongly modulated the effects. With the exception of homosexual women, all participant groups looked longer and more often at attractive faces that corresponded with their sexual orientations. Interestingly, heterosexual and homosexual men and homosexual women looked longer and more often at the less attractive face of their non-preferred sex than the less attractive face of their preferred sex, evidence that less attractive faces of the preferred sex might have an aversive character. These findings provide evidence for the important role that sexual orientation plays in guiding visual exploratory behavior and evaluations of the attractiveness of others. (shrink)

Is democracy a human right? There is a growing consensus within international legal and political practice that the answer is “Yes.” However, some philosophers doubt that we should see democracy as a human right. In this paper I respond to the most systematic challenge presented so far, which was recently offered by Joshua Cohen. His challenge is directed to the view that democracy is a human right, not to the view that democracy is part of what justice demands. It is (...) instructive because it forces us to consider important questions about the nature and justification of human rights, including the putative human right to democracy. There is a tendency to see every claim of justice as a human right, and Cohen presses us to face the risk that this slip may occur in the case of democracy. Thus my aim is not simply to refute Cohen’s arguments but to engage the questions he forcefully and helpfully puts on the table. I start in section 2 by analyzing Cohen’s account of human rights. In section 3 I defend the human right to democracy against his challenge. I conclude in section 4 by articulating some reasons for the claim that democracy is a human right that mobilize and elaborate on some of Cohen’s own key premises. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical exploration of the capability approach to human rights (CAHR) with the specific aim of developing its potential for achieving a synthesis between “humanist” or “naturalistic” and “political” or “practical” perspectives in the philosophy of human rights. Section II presents a general strategy for achieving such a synthesis. Section III provides an articulation of the key insights of CAHR (its focus on actual realizations given diverse circumstances, its pluralism of grounds, its emphasis on freedom of choice, (...) its demand for public reasoning, its context-sensitive universalism, and its broad view of obligations). These insights go some way toward the achievement of the desired synthesis. But, as explained in IV.1, in its current form CAHR faces two serious objections by the defenders of the political perspective: the Gap Between Capabilities-Interests and Rights Objection and the Disconnect From Practice Objection. Answering these criticisms requires some amendments to CAHR. Section IV.2 suggests a response to the first objection based on the introduction of a contractualist framework of justification. Sections IV.3 and IV.4 tackle the second objection by introducing a re-characterization of the cosmopolitan standard underlying the humanist perspective and by identifying the differences and relations between various dimensions of a conception of human rights and their significance for actual political practice. The paper illustrates the practical implications of CAHR, in its modified form, for the pursuit of some important rights. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a model for understanding the relation between substance and procedure in discourse ethics and deliberative democracy capable of answering the common charge that they involve an ‘empty formalism’. The expressive-elaboration model introduced here answers this concern by arguing that the deliberative practical rationality presupposed by discourse ethics and deliberative democracy involves the creation of a practical medium in which certain general basic ideas of solidarity, equality and freedom are expressed and elaborated in (...) the context of widespread moral disagreement. In the course of this paper I propose an elucidation of these ideas and argue for the thesis that they are internally related to the endorsement of deliberative practical rationality. The three basic substantive ideas contribute to the determination of the existence, the form, the topics and intended outcomes, and the effects of the practice of public deliberation. This amounts to an elucidatory defense of deliberative practical rationality by explicating its substantive significance or point. Key Words: critical theory • deliberative democracy • discourse ethics • equality • freedom • Jürgen Habermas • practical reason • John Rawls • solidarity • substance and procedure. (shrink)

This paper presents a substantivist construal of discourse ethics, which claims that we should see our engagement in public deliberation as expressing and elaborating a substantive commitment to basic moral ideas of solidarity, equality, and freedom. This view is different from Habermas's standard formalist defence of discourse ethics, which attempts to derive the principle of discursive moral justification from primarily non-moral presuppositions of rational argumentation as such. After explicating the difference between the substantivist and the formalist construal, I defend the (...) former by showing that it is not only intuitively compelling, but also particularly well equipped for addressing four important objections recently levelled against discourse ethics and its political applications. I conclude by pointing out some consequences of the previous discussion for the future of Critical Theory. (shrink)

Why should we become posthuman? There is only one morally compelling answer to this question: because posthumanity will be a more beneficial state, better than present humanity. This is the Posthuman Beneficence Argument, the centerpiece of the liberal transhumanist defense of “directed evolution.” In this article, I examine PBA and find it deficient on a number of lethal counts. My argument focuses on the writings of transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom, who has developed the most articulate defense of PBA and disclosed (...) its metaethical framework. I begin by locating PBA in the context of wider transhumanist claims for the desirability of posthumanity. I identify two crucial components: a model of deliberative rationality, requiring reasons to endorse claims; and the reasons themselves. I examine these two conditions, in turn, specifying the claims that they ask us to accept. Following Bostrom, I argue that there is a need for a foundationalist approach that assures us of some universality in the process of valuation. This is required to appropriately ground the moral continuity and appeal to universality that PBA demands. I examine the reasons why this approach ultimately fails, leaving posthumanity as an unintelligible concept with no moral force. I conclude by identifying a more mature approach to the debate on human enhancement, one that forfeits the grandiose but baseless claims too often found in transhumanist defenses of directed evolution. In short, posthumanity may be a good science fiction trope, but it has no normative force in the moral philosophy of human enhancement. (shrink)

Are positive duties to help others in need mere informal duties of virtue or can they also be enforceable duties of justice? In this paper I defend the claim that some positive duties (which I call basic positive duties) can be duties of justice against one of the most important prin- cipled objections to it. This is the libertarian challenge, according to which only negative duties to avoid harming others can be duties of justice, whereas positive duties (basic or nonbasic) (...) must be seen, at best, as informal moral requirements or recommendations. I focus on the contractarian version of the libertarian challenge as recently presented by Jan Narveson. I claim that Narveson’s contractarian construal of libertarianism is not only intuitively weak, but is also subject to decisive internal problems. I argue, in particular, that it does not pro- vide a clear rationale for distinguishing between informal duties of virtue and enforceable duties of justice, that it can neither successfully justify libertarianism’s protection of negative rights nor its denial of positive ones, and that it fails to undermine the claim that basic positive duties are duties of global justice. -/- . (shrink)

Grounded in a will to adapt to dangers, and espouse both responsibility and resilience, voluntary measures have largely replaced one of the oldest public health strategies, quarantine. The Covid-19 pandemic, however, elicited a broad sweep of tactics from the archive of public health armoury. On a general level, this review essay addresses the common measures rolled out by various authorities against the pandemic - the lock-downs, reopening process, financial support and vaccination. By relating these measures to 1) the “plague-stricken town”, (...) deployed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe by the Polizeistaat; 2) the “self-regulation strategy” that emerged with liberal ideas at the end of the eighteenth century; and 3) the “minimum security” programmed by neoliberal governmentality in the second half of the twentieth century, it is suggested that tensions between freedom and security during, and after, the pandemic can be better understood. To end, the essay noticed that the pandemic has enforced tensions in the administration and calibration of individual wishes and collective wellbeing, creating a fragile “freedom-security relationship” and new problem space for self-regulation. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo busca reconstruir los principios metodológicos de la “arqueología de la política” que Foucault introduce hacia el final de L’archéologie du savoir aunque nunca desarrolla de manera explícita. La exposición se organiza en tres ejes. En primer lugar, explora los puntos de cruce y las posibles diferencias entre la arqueología del saber y la arqueología de la política. En segundo lugar, examina el lugar que podrían ocupar los “programas” y las “racionalidades de gobierno” en la arqueología de la (...) política. Por último, propone a la razón de Estado, el liberalismo y el neoliberalismo como posibles campos de investigación para el desarrollo de esa arqueología. Con ello se pretende obtener una “grilla de inteligibilidad” cuyo punto de partida no sean las categorías universales habitualmente utilizadas por el análisis jurídico-político procedente de los siglos XVI y XVII, sino las prácticas de los gobernantes y los gobernados.This article proposes to reconstruct the methodological principles of the “archaeology of politics” mentioned by Foucault at the end of L’archéologie du savoir, although never explicitly continued. The text is organized in three complementary axes. First, it explores the crossing points and possible differences between the archaeology of knowledge and the archaeology of politics. Second, it investigates the place that “programs” and “government rationalities” might take in the archeology of politics. Finally, it porposes the reason of State, liberalism and neoliberalism as possible research fields for the development of said archeology. Therefore, this article seeks to obtain a “grid of intelligibility” whose basis are not the universal categories usually used by legal-political analysis from the 16th and 17th centuries, but the practices of the governing and governed. (shrink)

¿Qué entendemos hoy por “neoliberalismo”? Si bien hay varias formas de contestar tal pregunta, la respuesta más frecuente consiste en asociarlo con la aplicación de un conjunto de medidas estrictamente económicas; de hecho, se dice que los neoliberales, casi por defecto congénito, no pueden pensar la realidad más allá de los números y las recetas abstractas. Siguiendo el método arqueológico-genealógico de Michel Foucault y de algunos de sus intérpretes contemporáneos, el presente artículo buscará revisar y en lo posible ampliar aquella (...) concepción crítica. Nuestra hipótesis es que el neoliberalismo no se reduce a un mero “economicismo”, sino que contiene más bien toda una dimensión “espiritual”, todo un campo de prácticas y de discursos que se conforma como respuesta ante el excesivo racionalismo de las sociedades modernas. La cuestión consiste en transformar a los hombres desde dentro, hasta el punto de tornarlos más aptos para acceder a un conjunto de valores y asimilar ciertas formas de comportamiento. Según sostiene este artículo, es en los escritos de Wilhelm Röpke, un economista y sociólogo alemán de mediados del siglo XX, donde mejor se aprecia la dimensión espiritual del neoliberalismo. Röpke proponía un “diagnóstico” y una “terapéutica”. El primero sostiene que los hombres padecen una enfermedad espiritual denominada como “masificación” y “proletarización”, mientras que la terapéutica procura hacer de esos hombres unos emprendedores de sí mismos. Tal sería el modo de superar los efectos adversos del capitalismo: transformando a los hombres masificados y proletarizados en sujetos completamente comprometidos con su profesión. No se trata sencillamente de recuperar un pensamiento casi olvidado por la historia, sino de explorar los límites de nuestro presente, especialmente de nuestras formas de subjetividad. Aunque muchas de las críticas contemporáneas no hayan reparado aún en ello, hay que preguntarse hasta qué punto los diagnósticos y las terapéuticas propuestas por neoliberales como Röpke persisten en la actualidad. Aquí no se darán respuestas tajantes y definitivas, pero sí algunos indicios al respecto. (shrink)

La realización del Proyecto Genoma Humano (PGH) supuso la utilización de diversas técnicas de cartografiado y secuenciación del genoma. En términos muy generales, los mapas del genoma permiten identificar y aislar genes individuales, esto es, fragmentos de ADN que codifican una determinada cadena polipeptídica. Por su parte, la secuenciación consiste en la determinación del orden de las bases nitrogenadas del ADN. Las técnicas implicadas en ambos procesos, aunque plurales y heterogéneas, tienen su origen en el ámbito de la biotecnología. En (...) su desarrollo constatamos cómo un conjunto de realidades heterogéneas se configuran como artefactos, operadores y relatores, en relación a otras configuraciones circulares y radiales con las que se codeterminan. (shrink)

El examen de los actores, instituciones y materiales implicados en el Proyecto Genoma Humano (PGH) remite inmediatamente al contexto de los macroproyectos científicos que suelen caracterizarse con el expresivo rótulo de «Big Science». Como es bien sabido, la afortunada expresión fue acuñada por el sociólogo de la ciencia Derek de Solla Price en 1936 quien elaboró su concepción considerando, principalmente, a la física de su época. Sin embargo, las ciencias biológicas tardaron varios decenios más en adquirir las dimensiones de la (...) Big Science. En el caso del PGH se presenta un panorama muy distinto al contexto en el que surgió la estructura de la doble hélice. El investigador aislado no tiene cabida en este contexto, y los grandes científicos son ahora directores de proyectos y el caso de James Watson es de nuevo paradigmático. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se estudia la génesis del Proyecto Genoma Humano (PGH) desde un enfoque filosófico. A la vista de la cuantiosa bibliografía sobre el tema, quizá las siguientes páginas pudieran parecer impertinentes, pero no pretendemos elaborar una mera paráfrasis, más o menos afortunada, de varios ensayos previos porque este trabajo supone una reacción crítica frente a esos mismos ensayos. Nuestro proceder es, desde un primer momento, dialéctico, pues supone una rectificación de las distintas exposiciones acerca de la génesis (...) del PGH. Por ello, hemos de tomarlas en consideración como contenidos del propio trabajo. El análisis pormenorizado sería excesivo; una breve reseña, casi a título inventarial, de los ejemplares más destacados permitirá ejemplificar los problemas mencionados, además de ofrecer un primer bosquejo de los contenidos y contornos de la investigación. (shrink)

La dimensión científica del Proyecto Genoma Humano (PGH) remite a un conjunto de entidades de orden biológico: bases nitrogenadas, genes, enzimas, SNP’s1, etc., sobre las cuales se ejercitan las operaciones tecnológicas que dan lugar a la secuenciación del genoma. Un examen más atento muestra que todos los cuerpos, morfologías y estructuras que forman parte constituyente del PGH pueden circunscribirse al campo de la biología molecular, con lo cual están dados a la misma escala, lógicamente. Esta primera suposición, que habrá que (...) constatar en la reconstrucción ulterior, permite regresar hacia el curso de la constitución de la biología molecular, como factor del contexto histórico determinante del PGH, sin tener que retrotraerse a procesos anteriores de la historia de la biología para dar razón de la conformación y conexión de los trazos que forman parte de la figura de referencia. (shrink)

Durante su intercambio epistolar con Spinoza, Tschirnhaus defiende la imposibilidad de deducir la naturaleza de los cuerpos particulares a partir de la sola extensión. El motivo de esta objeción reside en su dificultad para desmarcarse de la concepción sustancial de los cuerpos como partes finitas de la extensión sostenida por Descartes. Esta dificultad inicial, sin embargo, queda ensombrecida por la intervención de Leibniz en un momento clave de la correspondencia que convertirá la disputa de carácter físico en una controversia teológica. (...) Este artículo demuestra que el problema metafísico detectado por Leibniz consiste en la afirmación radical del principio de plenitud contenida en la proposición 16 de la primera parte de la Ética y las consecuencias heréticas que de ésta se desprenden. El examen del papel que la crítica de Leibniz jugó en el desarrollo de la discusión permitirá leer bajo una nueva luz tanto la paradójica actitud de Tschirnhaus como las enigmáticas y elusivas respuestas de Spinoza. (shrink)

Scholars have considered that Spinoza’s difficulties in dealing with the objections raised by Tschirnhaus against his physical approaches were the spur that led the latter to dissociate himself from the former in the field of natural philosophy. The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to refute this misjudgment and, on the other, to show that the cause of it lies in having dismissed a significant post-Cartesian current of thought, buried in oblivion by the triumph of Newtonian mechanics, (...) which intended to develop a physics in purely relational terms. In turn, this will allow us to read the physical proposals of Spinoza and Tschirnhaus as paradigmatic examples of this relational physics. (shrink)

El ajuste entre Estado y nación en Latinoamérica ha observado complicaciones desde la fundación de sus repúblicas. La pluralidad de subjetividades, realidades materiales y brechas, sumadas a las coyunturales demandas insatisfechas y una débil institucionalidad influyeron en que las construcciones nacionales hayan tenido un componente populista en diferentes intentos refundadores. En los países andinos ese componente se expresa a partir de unas condiciones sociopolíticas previas a las performativas identidades nacionales y la presencia de liderazgos personalistas. Parte de los estudios sobre (...) identidades nacionales en estos países se centraron en el análisis de sus liderazgos y discursos. Otros optaron por centrarse en los procesos o condiciones de posibilidad que favorecen la irrupción de estas identidades. El objetivo del trabajo es brindar una base epistemológica que emerja de la compatibilidad entre los anteriores abordajes explicativos de las identidades nacionales. (shrink)

RESUMEN La polémica sobre los prejuicios es un símbolo distintivo de la Ilustración alemana. Este artículo presenta aspectos históricos de esta polémica que resultan útiles para esclarecer el pensamiento de Kant. Se argumenta que la posición kantiana respecto de ella, como una polémica en la que convive una perspectiva que busca la liberación de todo prejuicio y otra que permite que algunos permanezcan, y hasta los estima como útiles, representa un esfuerzo por conciliar ambas perspectivas, y anticipa la distinción planteada (...) en la "Dialéctica trascendental" entre el uso regulativo y constitutivo de las ideas. ABSTRACT The controversy over prejudices is a distinctive feature ofthe German Enlightenment. The article addresses some historical aspects of this controversy that are useful to shed light on Kant's thought. Enlightenment positions ranged from the perspective seeking to rid itself of all prejudices, to that which allows for some prejudices and even considers them useful. The article argues that the Kantian position on the matter constitutes an effort to reconcile these perspectives, thus anticipating the distinction set forth in the "Transcendental Dialectic" between the regulative and the constitutive use of ideas. (shrink)

In a note introduced into the second edition of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1794), Kant assigns a systematic role to the General Remarks at the end of each Part of his book. He calls those Remarks, “as it were, parerga to religion within the boundaries of pure reason; they do not belong within it yet border on it” (RGV 6:52). As Kant sees them, the parerga are only a “secondary occupation” that consists in removing transcendent obstacles. This (...) paper is skeptical of Kant's view. It proposes an alternative account, according to which the parerga are essential to our moral education, since they force human reason to confront its own limitations and resist the urge to take refuge in spurious religious beliefs. That urge, I argue, is linked to the propensity to evil, and uses religious orthodoxy to undermine moral religion. By clipping our dogmatic wings, the parerga encourage reason to face its own dialectical tendencies and direct its speculative interest to immanent practical use. This redirection counteracts the debilitating effects of the propensity to evil and plays a key role in our moral regeneration. To consider the parerga “derivative,” as Kant himself does, is therefore a grave mistake. (shrink)

In a note introduced into the second edition of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1794), Kant assigns a systematic role to the General Remarks at the end of each Part of his book. He calls those Remarks, “as it were, parerga to religion within the boundaries of pure reason; they do not belong within it yet border on it” (RGV 6:52). As Kant sees them, the parerga are only a “secondary occupation” that consists in removing transcendent obstacles. This (...) paper is skeptical of Kant's view. It proposes an alternative account, according to which the parerga are essential to our moral education, since they force human reason to confront its own limitations and resist the urge to take refuge in spurious religious beliefs. That urge, I argue, is linked to the propensity to evil, and uses religious orthodoxy to undermine moral religion. By clipping our dogmatic wings, the parerga encourage reason to face its own dialectical tendencies and direct its speculative interest to immanent practical use. This redirection counteracts the debilitating effects of the propensity to evil and plays a key role in our moral regeneration. To consider the parerga “derivative,” as Kant himself does, is therefore a grave mistake. (shrink)

This article analyzes the main reasons offered by the literature in relation to the question of whether pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and selection should be allowed in the context of assisted reproduction techniques to avoid the birth of children with disabilities. The bioethical literature faces a challenge from the disability discourse. When the oppressive social dimension of disability is taken into account, it results in a series of questions that could challenge the most settled conclusions of the bioethical debate. However, the (...) social model has not been without criticism and one of them, the underestimation of the importance of biological traits origin against a disability of social origin, resonates particularly in the debate on preimplantation genetic selection. (shrink)

Different conceptions of scientific theories, such as the state spaces approach of Bas van Fraassen, the phase spaces approach of Frederick Suppe, the set-theoretical approach of Patrick Suppes, and the structuralist view of Joseph Sneed et al. are usually put together into one big family. In addition, the definite article is normally used, and thus we speak of the semantic conception of theories and of its different approaches . However, in The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism , starting (...) from certain remarks already made in “Theory Structure” , Current Research in Philosophy of Science, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1979, pp. 317–338), Frederick Suppe excludes the structuralist view as well as other “European” versions from the semantic conception of theories. In this paper I will critically examine the reasons put forward by Suppe for this decision and, later, I will provide a general characterization of the semantic family and of the structuralist view of theories in such a way as to justify the inclusion of the structuralist view as a member of this family. (shrink)